This is Part II, a follow-on discussion of older U.S. case law and IRS rulings that address how and when individuals are subject to U.S. taxation before and after they assert they are no longer U.S. citizens.

I might point out that I am of the belief that we humans always like to hear the news we want to hear; and/or interpret it in the way we find most beneficial to us.  Who doesn’t like good news versus bad news?  Whether we (laypeople and tax lawyers alike) interpret Section 877A(g)(4) in any particular way; it is of no real consequence when it is the IRS that will enforce the law and ultimately the Department of Justice, Tax Division who will handle any such case interpreting this provision before a U.S. District Court or the Court of Federal Claims.  For those who have not litigated before these Courts and seen how aggressive are the government lawyers in advocating for the government, the following discussion will hopefully be illustrative.

See, Part I: Tax Timing Problems for Former U.S. Citizens is Nothing New – the IRS and the Courts Have Decided Similar Issues in the Past (Pre IRC Section 877A(g)(4)), dated October 16, 2015.

The question is what is the correct date of “relinquishment of citizenship” as defined in the statute; IRC Section 877A(g)(4)?  Many argue the law cannot be applied retroactively?

However, the specific case discussed here, did just that; applied the law retroactively to determine U.S. citizenship status of an individual and corresponding tax obligations.  This was also in a time of a much simpler tax code with (i) no international information reporting requirements (e.g., IRS Forms 8938, 8858, 5471, 8865, 3520, 3520-A, 926, 8621, etc.), (ii) no Title 31 “FBAR” reporting requirements and (iii) no constant drumbeat by the IRS of international taxpayers and enforcement.  See, recent announcement by IRS on Oct. 16, 2015 (one day after tax returns were required to be filed by many) Offshore Compliance Programs Generate $8 Billion; IRS Urges People to Take Advantage of Voluntary Disclosure Programs.  However, for cautionary posts on the IRS OVDP and the deceptive numbers published (e.g., “$8 Billion”), see How is the offshore voluntary disclosure program really working? Not well for USCs and LPRs living overseas posted May 10, 2014 and The 2013 GAO Report  of the IRS Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program, International Tax Journal, CCH Wolters Kluwer, January-February 2014.   PDF version here.

Of course, the answer to this question helps determine if and when will the individual be subject to the federal tax laws of the U.S. on their worldwide income and global assets.  In the case of Ms. Lucienne D’Hotelle (an interesting 1977 appellate opinion from the firs circuit) she had spent little time in the U.S. and had sent a letter in her native language French to the U.S. Department of State, which stated “I have never considered myself to be a citizen of the United States.”  This is  not unlike many individuals around the world today;  at least as of late – in the era of FATCA, who assert they are not a U.S. citizen because they “relinquish[ed] it by the performance of certain expatriating acts with the required “intent” to give up the US citizenship” and did not notify the U.S. federal government.

The Court nevertheless found Ms. Lucienne D’Hotelle retroactively subject to U.S. income taxation on her non-U.S. source income (up until she received a certificate of loss of nationality from the Department of State); for specific years even when the immigration law provisions of the day said she was no longer a U.S. citizen during that same retroactive period.

There have been many contemporary commentators who argue an individual does not need to (i) have, (ii) do, or (iii) receive any of the following, and yet still should be able to successfully argue they have shed themselves of U.S. citizenship and hence the obligations of U.S. taxation and reporting on their worldwide income and global assets –

(i) receive a U.S. federal government issued document (e.g., a certificate of loss of nationality “CLN” per 877A(g)(4)(C)),

(ii) receive a cancelation of a naturalized citizen’s certificate of naturalization by a U.S. court (per 877A(g)(4)(D)),

(iii) provide a signed statement of voluntary relinquishment from the individual to the U.S. Department of State (per 877A(g)(4)(B)), or

(iv) provide proof of an in person renunciation before a diplomatic or consular officer of the U.S. (per  paragraph (5) of section 349(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1481(a)(5)), in accordance with 877A(g)(4)(C)).

Some older tax cases that interpreted similar concepts are worthy of consideration.  They will certainly be in any brief of the attorneys for the U.S. Department of Justice, Tax Division and/or Chief Counsel lawyers for the IRS in any case where the individual challenges that none of the above items are required in their particular case to avoid U.S. taxation and reporting requirements.

The D’Hotelle case is illustrative of the efforts taken by the Department of Justice, Tax Division in collecting U.S. income tax on a naturalized citizen.  You will notice they did not take a sympathetic approach to her case.   Ms. Lucienne D’Hotelle was born in France in 1909 and died in 1968 in France, yet the U.S. government continued to pursue collection of U.S. income taxation on her foreign source income from the Dominican Republic, France and apparently Puerto Rico even after her death during a period of time when she used a U.S. passport.  Lucienne D’Hotelle de Benitez Rexach, 558 F.2d 37 (1st Cir.1977).  She, not unlike many individuals today, claimed she was not a U.S. citizen – or at least stated “I have never considered myself to be a citizen of the United States.”

Some of the particularly interesting facts relevant to Ms. D’Hotelle, a naturalized citizen, which are relevant to the question of U.S. taxation of citizens, were set forth in the appellate court’s decision as follows:

Lucienne D’Hotelle was born in France in 1909. She became Lucienne D’Hotelle de Benitez Rexach upon her marriage to Felix in San Juan, Puerto Rico in 1928. She was naturalized as a United States citizen on December 7, 1942. The couple spent some time in the Dominican Republic, where Felix engaged in harbor construction projects. Lucienne established a residence in her native France on November 10, 1946 and remained a resident until May 20, 1952. During that time s 404(b) of the Nationality Act of 1940² provided that naturalized citizens who returned to their country of birth and resided there for three years lost their American citizenship. On November 10, 1947, after Lucienne had been in France for one year, the American Embassy in Paris issued her a United States passport valid through November 9, 1949. Soon after its expiration Lucienne applied in Puerto Rico for a renewal. By this time she had resided in France for three years.

                                         * * *

On May 20, 1952, the Vice-Consul there signed a Certificate of Loss of Nationality, citing Lucienne’s continuous residence in France as having automatically divested her of citizenship under s 404(b). Her passport . . . was confiscated, cancelled and never returned to her. The State Department approved the certificate on December 23, 1952. Lucienne made no attempt to regain her American citizenship; neither did she affirmatively renounce it.

                                         * * *

Predictably, the United States eventually sought to tax Lucienne for her half of that income. Whether by accident or design, the government’s efforts began in earnest shortly after the Supreme Court invalidated *40 the successor statute⁴ to s 404(b). In in Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964), the Court held that the distinction drawn by the statute between naturalized and native-born Americans was so discriminatory as to violate due process. In January 1965, about two months after this suit was filed, the State Department notified Lucienne by letter that her expatriation was void under Schneider and that the State Department considered her a citizen. Lucienne replied that she had accepted her denaturalization without protest and had thereafter considered herself not to be an American citizen.

There are other facts that make clear the government was not fond of her husband, the income that he earned and how he managed his and his wife’s assets during and after her death.  The Court also discusses at length the fact that she had used a U.S. passport during the years when she alleges she was not a U.S. citizen.  The Court goes on to analyze her U.S. citizenship, and the following discussions are illustrative of the ultimate tax consequences.

There has been a case floating around since a complaint was filed this summer by Senator Rand Paul (current Presidential candidate) and various other current and former U.S. citizens including a Mr. Kisch who is resident in Toronto, Canada and a Mr. Crawford who lives in Albania; along with other individuals.  Crawford v. United States Dep’t of the Treasury, 2015 U.S. Dist.  The complaint asked for declaratory and injunctive relief.

The District Court granted neither and dismissed the case in favor of the government in a bold fashion upholding FATCA and FBAR/Title 31 reporting and information requirements.   Importantly, the Court concluded by saying ” . . . The FATCA statute, the IGAs, and the FBAR requirements encourage compliance with tax laws, combat tax evasion, and deter the use of foreign accounts to engage in criminal activity. A preliminary injunction would harm these efforts and intrude upon the province of Congress and the President to determine how best to achieve these policy goals.”

See a prior post regarding how FATCA affects United States citizens (USCs) and lawful permanent residents (LPRs) residing outside the U.S.; as was the case of many of the complainants in the case, Part 1- Unintended Consequences of FATCA – for USCs and LPRs Living Outside the U.S., posted August 13, 2014.

Also, the tax publication/resource, Tax Analysts summarized the original complaint (which can be read in its entirety here) as follows:

           The FATCA suit makes the following claims:

• the IGAs are unconstitutional sole executive agreements because they exceed the scope of the president’s independent constitutional powers, and because they override FATCA;
• the heightened reporting requirements for foreign financial accounts deny U.S. citizens living abroad the equal protection of the laws;
• the FATCA FFI penalty, passthrough penalty, and willfulness penalty are all unconstitutional under the excessive fines clause;
• FATCA’s information reporting requirements are unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment; and
• the IGAs’ information reporting requirements are also unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.

See, complete Tax Note’s article of July 15, 2015:  Sen. Paul Files Lawsuit Challenging FATCA, by William R. Davis and Andrew Velarde.

Not unsurprisingly, the District Court ruled in favor of the government and dismissed the majority of the claims by a finding that the parties lacked standing to bring the suit and that ” . . . The FATCA statute, the IGAs, and the FBAR requirements encourage compliance with tax laws . . .”

Some highlights of the Court’s opinion [with my emphasis added] are set out below:

* * *

1. Background

A. FATCA Statute and Regulations

Congress passed the Foreign Accounts Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) in 2010 to improve compliance with tax laws by U.S. taxpayers holding foreign accounts. FATCA accomplishes this through two forms of reporting: (1) by foreign financial institutions (FFIs) about financial accounts held by U.S. taxpayers or foreign entities in which U.S. taxpayers hold a substantial ownership interest, 26 U.S.C. § 1471; and, (2) by U.S. taxpayers about their interests in certain foreign financial accounts and offshore assets. 26 U.S.C. § 6038D.

1. FATCA

President Obama signed FATCA into law on March 18, 2010. Senator Carl Levin, a co-sponsor of the FATCA legislation, declared that “offshore tax abuses [targeted by FATCA] cost the federal treasury an estimated $100 billion in lost tax revenues annually” 156 Cong. Rec. 5 S1745-01 (2010). FATCA became law as the IRS began its Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program (OVDP), which since 2009 has allowed U.S. taxpayers with undisclosed overseas assets to disclose them and pay reduced penalties. By 2014, the OVDP collected $6.5 billion through voluntary disclosures from 45,000 participants. “IRS Makes Changes to Offshore Programs; Revisions Ease Burden and Help More Taxpayers Come into Compliance,” http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/IRS-Makes-Changes-to-Offshore-Programs;-Revisions-Ease-Burden-and-Help-More-Taxpayers-Come-into-Compliance (last visited Sept. 15, 2015). The success of the voluntary program has likely been enhanced by the existence of FATCA.

* * *

C. Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Account

The third body of law at issue in this case pertains to the Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Account (FBAR) requirements.  U.S. persons who hold a financial account in a foreign country that exceeds $10,000 in aggregate value must file an FBAR with the Treasury Department reporting the account. See 31 U.S.C. § 5314; 31 C.F.R. § 1010.350; 31 C.F.R. § 1010.306(c). The current FBAR form is FinCEN Form 114. The form has been due by June 30 of each year regarding accounts held during the previous calendar year. § 1010.306(c). Beginning with the 2016 tax year, the due date of the form will be April 15. Pub. L. No. 114-41, § 2006(b)(11). A person who fails to file a required FBAR may be assessed a civil monetary penalty. 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)(A). The amount of the penalty is capped at $10,000 unless the failure was willful. See 5321(a)(5)(B)(i), (C). A willful failure to file increases the maximum penalty to $100,000 or half the value in the account at the time of the violation, whichever is greater. § 5321(a)(5)(C). In either case, whether to impose the penalty and the amount of the penalty are committed to the Secretary’s discretion. See § 5321(a)(5)(A) (“The Secretary of the Treasury may impose a civil money penalty[.]”) & § 5321(a)(5)(B) (“[T]he amount of any civil penalty . . . shall not exceed” the statutory ceiling). Plaintiffs seek to enjoin enforcement of the willful FBAR penalty under § 5321(a)(5). Prayer for Relief, part Q. They also ask for an injunction against “the FBAR account-balance reporting requirement” of FinCen Form 114. Prayer for Relief, part W.

      The Government asserts that the information in the FBAR assists law enforcement and the IRS in identifying unreported taxable income of U.S. taxpayers that is held in foreign accounts as  well as investigating money laundering and terrorism.

* * *

     Mark Crawford decries his bank’s policy against taking U.S. citizens as clients and claims the denial of his application for a brokerage account may have “impacted Mark financially,” ¶ 21, any such harm is not fairly traceable to an action by Defendants, which are not responsible for decisions that foreign banks make about whom to accept as clients. Crawford cannot establish standing indirectly when third parties are the causes of his alleged injuries. See Shearson, 725 F.3d at 592. Moreover, his discomfort with complying with the disclosures required by FATCA, see ¶23, does not establish the concrete, particularized harm that confers standing to sue. See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (requiring “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent” injury). Even if Crawford fears “unconstitutionally excessive fines imposed by 31 U.S.C. § 5321 if he willfully fails to file an FBAR,” ¶ 24, there is no allegation that he failed to file any FBAR that may have been required, much less that the Government has assessed an “excessive” FBAR penalty against him. Any harm that may come his way from imagined future events is speculative and cannot form the foundation for his lawsuit.

* * *

    None of the allegations states that Kuettel is presently being harmed by FATCA or the Swiss IGA, and neither FATCA nor the IGA apply to him as a non-U.S. citizen. See ¶¶ 51-58.  His assertion of past harm because he was “mostly unsuccessful” in refinancing his mortgage due to FATCA does not convey standing. If that was a harm, it was due to actions of third-party foreign banks not those of Defendants. Regardless, having now renounced his American citizenship and obtained refinancing on terms he found acceptable, any past harm is not redressable here. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 210-11 (1995) (“[T]he fact of past injury . . . does nothing to establish a real and immediate threat that he would again suffer similar injury in the future.” (quotation omitted)). This leaves Kuettel’s claims concerning the FBAR requirement, in Counts 3 and 6, for which the Government concedes Kuettel has standing. Response, ECF 16, at 15, PAGEID 216.

* * *

    Donna-Lane Nelson is a citizen of Switzerland who has also renounced her U.S. citizenship. ¶ 59. She alleges that her Swiss bank “notified her that she would not be able to open a new account if she ever closed her existing one because she was an American. Fearing that she would eventually not be able to bank in the country where she lived, she decided to relinquish her U.S. citizenship.” ¶ 65. After she renounced, a Swiss bank “offered investment opportunities that were not available to her as an American.” Id. She “resents having to provide” “explanations” to Swiss banks that have requested information on her past U.S. citizenship and payments to her daughter, who lives in the United States, and she sees “threats implied by these requests which appear to be prompted by FATCA.” ¶ 68. Like other Plaintiffs, Nelson does not want to disclose financial information to the Government, and she fears willful FBAR penalties, even though no such penalty has been imposed or threatened against her. ¶¶ 69, 70. Unlike the preceding Plaintiffs, however, she adds that she fears the 30% withholding tax may be imposed against her “if her business partner,” who is now her husband, and with whom she has joint accounts, “opts to become a recalcitrant account holder.” ¶

* * *

L. Marc Zell states that he is a practicing attorney and a citizen of both the United States and Israel who lives in Israel. He alleges that: (1) he and his firm have been required by Israeli banking institutions to complete IRS withholding forms for individuals whose funds his firm holds in trust, regardless of whether the forms are legally required, causing certain clients to leave his firm, ¶¶ 79 & 81; (2) Israeli banks have required his firm to close accounts, refused to open others, and requested conduct contrary to banking regulations, ¶¶ 79-80; and, (3) the compelled disclosure of his fiduciary relationship with clients impinges on the attorney-client relationship, ¶ 82. On request of clients, who claim their rights are violated by FATCA, Zell “has decided not to comply with the FATCA disclosure requirements whenever that alternative exists.” ¶ 83. He fears that the FATCA 30% withholding tax on pass-through payments to recalcitrant account holders could be imposed due to his refusal to provide identifying information about a client to an Israeli bank. ¶ He also has refused to provide information to his own bank and “fears that he will be classified as a recalcitrant account holder,” ¶ 85. Like the other Plaintiffs, he does not want his financial information disclosed, ¶ 86, and fears an FBAR penalty if the IRS determines that he willfully failed to file an FBAR, ¶ 87.

     The majority of Zell’s allegations concern conduct of Israeli banks and his belief that the actions have been unfair to him or his clients. But conduct of third parties (even if related to the banks’ compliance with FATCA) does not confer standing to bring suit against Defendants. See, e.g., Ammex Inc. v. United States, 367 F.3d 530, 533 (6th Cir. 2004). Nor may Zell seek redress on behalf of third parties who have allegedly suffered harm, including unidentified clients. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). The third parties who have allegedly suffered harm are not plaintiffs, thus, alleged harm to them does not provide a basis for Zell to maintain this suit. The contention that disclosure of the identity of clients for whom Zell holds funds in trust violates the attorney-client privilege is also without merit. He gives no example of harm that has occurred or how he was harmed by disclosure of clients’ identities. He cannot raise the attorney-client privilege on his clients’ behalf, nor is the fact of representation privileged. See In re Special Sept. 1978 Grand Jury (II), 640 F.2d 49, 62 (7th Cir. 1980) (“[A]ttorney-client privilege belongs to the client alone[.]”); United States v. Robinson, 121 F.3d 971, 976 (5th Cir. 1997) (“The fact of representation . . . is generally not within the privilege.”). It is the fiduciary relationship, not the attorney-client relationship, that is the basis for the reporting requirement.

* * *

   “We begin, of course, with the presumption that the challenged statute”—FATCA—“is  valid. Its wisdom is not the concern of the courts; if a challenged action does not violate the Constitution, it must be sustained[.]” INS v. Chadha, 426 U.S. 919, 944 (1983); see also National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2594 (2012) (“‘[E]very reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.’” (quoting Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895))).

* * *

Plaintiffs decry that U.S. citizens living in foreign countries are in this manner treated differently than U.S. citizens living in the United States. According to Plaintiffs, the federal government has no legitimate interest in knowing the amount of any income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit recognized on a foreign account, whether a foreign account was opened or closed during the year, or the balance of a foreign account.

       Plaintiffs contend that the “heightened reporting requirements” imposed by FATCA, the FBAR information-reporting requirements, and the Canadian, Swiss, Czech, and Israeli IGAs, violate the Fifth Amendment rights of “U.S. citizens living in a foreign country” and should be enjoined. See Complaint ¶¶ 124-130

* * *

Plaintiffs’ equal protection claims fail because the statutes, regulations, and executive agreements that they challenge simply do not make the classification they assert. None of the challenged provisions single out U.S. citizens living abroad. Instead, all Americans with specified foreign bank accounts or assets are subject to reporting requirements, no matter where they happen to live. The provisions Plaintiffs contend discriminate against “U.S. citizens living abroad” actually apply to all U.S. taxpayers, no matter their residence.

* * *

The distinction that the regulations do make is rationally related to a legitimate government interest. The U.S. tax system is based in large part on voluntary compliance: taxpayers are expected to disclose their sources of income annually on their federal tax returns. The information reporting required by FATCA is intended to address the use of offshore accounts to facilitate tax evasion, and to strengthen the integrity of the voluntary compliance system by placing U.S. taxpayers that have access to offshore investment opportunities in an equal position with U.S. taxpayers that invest within the United States. Third party information reporting is an important tool used by the IRS to close the tax gap between taxes due and taxes paid. The knowledge that financial institutions will also be disclosing information about an account encourages individuals to properly disclose their income on their tax returns. See Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in Tax Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695, 711 (2007).

       Unlike most countries, U.S. taxpayers are subject to tax on their worldwide income, and their  investments have become increasingly global in scope. Absent the FATCA reporting by FFIs, some U.S. taxpayers may attempt to evade U.S. tax by hiding money in offshore accounts where, prior to FATCA, they were not subject to automatic reporting to the IRS by FFIs. The information required to be reported, including payments made or credited to the account and the balance or value of the account is to assist the IRS in determining previously unreported income and the value of such information is based on experience from the DOJ prosecution of offshore tax evasion. See Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations bipartisan report on “Offshore Tax Evasion: The Effort to Collect Unpaid Taxes on Billions in Hidden Offshore Accounts,” February 26, 2014; see also Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 29 (1974) (“when law enforcement personnel are confronted with the secret foreign bank account or the secret foreign financial institution they are placed in an impossible situation…they must subject themselves to time consuming and often times fruitless foreign legal process.”).

The FBAR reporting requirements, likewise, have a rational basis. As the Supreme Court noted in California Bankers, when Congress enacted the Bank Secrecy Act (which provides the statutory basis for the FBAR), it “recognized that the use of financial institutions, both domestic and foreign, in furtherance of activities designed to evade the regulatory mechanism of the United States, had markedly increased.” Id. at 38. The Government has a legitimate interest in collecting information about foreign accounts, including account balances held by U.S. citizens, for the same reason that it requires reporting of information on U.S.-based accounts. The information assists law enforcement and the IRS, among other things, in identifying unreported taxable income of U.S. taxpayers that is held in foreign accounts. Without FBAR reporting, the Government’s efforts to track financial crime and tax evasion would be hampered.

* * *

In Count Six, Plaintiffs contend that the FBAR “Willfullness Penalty” is unconstitutional under the Excessive Fines Clause. Plaintiffs decry that 26 U.S.C. § 5321 imposes a penalty of up to $100,000 or 50% of the balance of the account at the time of the violation, whichever is greater, for failures to file an FBAR as required by 26 U.S.C. § 5314 (the FBAR “Willfulness Penalty”). 31 U.S.C. § 5321(b)(5)(C)(i). 31

Plaintiffs allege the Willfulness Penalty is designed to punish and is therefore subject to the Excessive Fines Clause. Plaintiffs further allege the Willfulness Penalty is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offense.

Plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claims, however, are not ripe for adjudication because no withholding or FBAR penalty has been imposed against any Plaintiff . . .

* * *

IV. Conclusion

Plaintiffs have failed to establish that they are entitled to a preliminary injunction . . .  The FATCA statute, the IGAs, and the FBAR requirements encourage compliance with tax laws, combat tax evasion,37 and deter the use of foreign accounts to engage in criminal activity. A preliminary injunction would harm these efforts and intrude upon the province of Congress and the President to determine how best to achieve these policy goals. Thus, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, ECF 8, is DENIED.

DONE and ORDERED in Dayton, Ohio, this Tuesday, September 29, 2015.

* * *

Crawford v. U.S. Department of Treasury, 15-cv-00250, U.S. District Court, Southern District of Ohio (Dayton).

For those U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents residing outside the U.S. who expected the Courts to be sympathetic to their legal arguments somehow invalidating  Chapter 4/FATCA and the FBAR filing requirements under Title 31, they will surely be disappointed by the result.

Information and more information is the mantra of revised IRS Forms as a result of FATCA.  See,  FATCA Driven – New IRS Forms W-8BEN versus W-8BEN-E versus W-9 (etc. etc.) for USCs and LPRs Overseas – It’s All About Information and More Information

U.S. citizens residing outside the U.S. along with lawful permanent residents (“LPRs”) are not the only persons who need to understand the IRS forms referenced above.  Indeed, all entities and institutions, whether they are small privately held companies or large and traditional financial institutions are required to complete and have signed a range of IRS forms.

The forms can be either the actual IRS form, or a satisfactory substitute form.  Many individuals are of the erroneous view that if they are not financial institutions, they do not need to concern themselves with these classifications.

Unfortunately, that is not the case.  Also, these classification rules apply to the surprise of many, if there are (or are not) U.S. persons involved.

In addition to a basic understanding of U.S. laws, it is also crucial that the parties see if their country has entered into an IGA.  For instance, if we examine the tiny little country of Liechtenstein which has a relatively large financial sector, it is necessary to first classify the type of entity.

All of this is necessary in order to properly determine which IRS form is to be required to be completed (e.g., IRS Form W-8BEN-E o W-8BEN o W-9 or W-8IMY or W-8EXP, etc.).  In addition, each of these classifications will help determine how to complete such forms. 

For instance, if it is a Liechtenstein Stiftung, it will probably (but not necessary) be a trust and not a corporation. See the IRS Memorandum from 2009 that provides that a Liechtenstein Stiftung will be classified as a trust, if its primary purpose is to protect or conserve the property transferred to the Stiftung for the Stiftung’s beneficiaries and is usually not established primarily for actively carrying on business activities.^[1]

[1] See Memorandum Number: AM2009-012, dated October 16, 2009, issued by the Office of Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service.

Next, in this example, with a Liechtenstein Stiftung, the country of Liechtenstein has entered into an Intergovernmental Agreement (“IGA”).

Hence, the terms of the IGA are most important.  Under the IGA, as is the case generally for FATCA, the entity has to be either an Foreign Financial Institution (“FFI” or “FI”) or a Non-Financial Foreign Entity (“NFFE”).

1)         Definition of Financial Institution (“FI”)

A financial institution is any entity that:

• Accepts deposits in the ordinary course of a banking or similar business (“Depository Institution”);^[1]
• Holds, as a substantial portion of its business financial assets for the benefit of one or more other persons (“Custodial Institution”);^[2]
• Is an investment entity; or
• Is an specified insurance company or holding company that is a member of an expanded group;^[3]

[1] See Article 1(i), IGA.

[2] See Article 1(h), IGA.

[3] See Article 1(k), IGA.

Generally a private Liechtenstein Stiftung would not satisfy any of these requirements (although it could conceivably be the case that one could be an “investment entity”).  Hence, it would generally be an NFFE and not an FI.

NFFEs can be passive or active. The kind of compliance obligations varies depending on the type of NFFE (passive or active).

1. Passive NFFEs

 A passive NFFE is an NFFE which is not an active NFFE or a withholding foreign partnership or withholding foreign trust.^[1]

There are several criteria under which a NFFE can be classified as an active NFFE. The following explain the most relevant criteria.

1. Active NFFEs

Among the criteria that the IGA establishes, under which a NFFE can be considered as an Active NFFE, are the following:

1)                If less than 50% of the NFFE’s gross income is passive income and less than 50% of the assets held by the NFFE are assets that produce or are held for the production of passive income during the preceding calendar year.  A

2)                Substantially all of the activities of the NFFE consist of holding (in whole or in part) the outstanding stock of, or providing financing and businesses other than the business of a Financial Institution.

Sometimes trusts or Stiftungs will also participate in or hold interests in companies, some of which may engage in active trades or businesses or simply hold passive investments. On the contrary, the companies/subsidiaries only hold other assets from which they derived passive income (e.g., dividends, interests, rents, royalties, etc.).^[2]

This will determine if a Stiftung will be classified as a Passive NFFE or not under FATCA regulations and the IGA.

[1] It also can make a difference if the trust (or Stiftung in this example) is a so-called “withholding” foreign trust; which generally requires an agreement with the IRS.

[2] Treas. Reg. § 1.1472-1.

Not surprisingly, the above analysis is complex, because the rules are complex.  Accordingly, it has been the author’s experience, that many institutions around the world which request one or more of the above IRS Forms have great difficulty in even implementing these rules.  Most of their employees seem to have little understanding of what is a very complex area of law, even when their resident country has issued extensive regulations or guidance about how the terms of the IGA are to be implemented.

For decades, the IRS largely worked in a vacuum, relative to other government agencies.

Changes started in earnest in 2003 after September 11, 2001, when Congress past various anti-terrorism laws.  For details of the history and how and when the IRS became responsible for these functions, the IRS Internal Revenue Manual has a detailed explanation – Part 4, Chapter 26, Section 5. Bank Secrecy Act History and Law

In April 2003, the IRS became in charge of civil enforcement of foreign account information under Title 31.  See IRM, Part 4, Chapter 26, Section 16. Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR).

The world has changed dramatically in these past few years and the IRS no longer works in such  a vacuum.  For a history of foreign bank and Congressional influences, see, How Congressional Hearings (Particularly In the Senate) Drive IRS and Justice Department Behavior

Today there are a host of governmental inter-agency activities along with foreign government exchanges of information;  e.g., DHS, Department of State, ICE, USCIS, foreign government exchanges of information under FATCA IGAs, a plethora of federal “intelligence agencies” for “terrorism related requests” as identified in IRM pursuant to IRC Section 6103(i), foreign governments under tax treaty exchanges, among many others.

The law is not even clear as to which agencies qualify as “intelligence agencies” as they are not identified in the statute and many are presumably classified organizations.

• Who is an “intelligence agency” for purposes of the statute?

The following is a list of some of the intelligence agencies that are presumably included in the federal tax statute Section 6103(i)(7):

A less secret organization is the Social Security Administration which now increasingly intersect with the work of

the IRS.  Also, the Department of State now provides warnings on its Passport applications about tax consequences and requirements of social security numbers (“SSN”s).

See also how in an Application for a U.S. Passport there are now specifically references IRC Section 6039E.

Finally, see also how on the last page (page 28) of currently issued U.S. Passport (“Book“) and paragraph D that explains generally the taxation obligations of citizenship.

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Recent posts have focused on the dilemma facing U.S. citizens (USCs) who have no social security number (“SSN”).  See an older post (23 July 2014) –  Why do I have to get a Social Security Number to file a U.S. income tax return (USCs)?

These problems are quickly coming to the surface, now that financial institutions (“FFIs”) around the world and private companies and trusts (e.g., non-financial foreign entities -NFFEs) must have their owners and clients certify they are not U.S. citizens; OR report the accounts of such U.S. citizens to the IRS under FATCA and the intergovernmental agreements (“IGAs”).

See, U.S. Citizens Overseas who Wish to Renounce without a Social Security Number will Necessarily be a “Covered Expatriate”

The intricacies of this problem are highlighted in a technical paper I recently drafted and presented to the U.S. Treasury Department and the Joint Committee of Taxation, among other federal government groups.  Some key excerpts of that paper titled URGENT NEED FOR U.S. CITIZENS RESIDING OUTSIDE THE U.S. TO BE ABLE TO OBTAIN A TAXPAYER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (“TIN”) OTHER THAN A SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER are set out below in this section:

The U.S. tax law imposing taxation on the worldwide income of USCs^[1] residing overseas has created a dilemma that prejudices these USCs without a SSN. This strict SSN/TIN regulatory rule undermines the basic tax administration system and discourages tax compliance for those USCs who never obtained a SSN.  This dilemma affects numerous USCs throughout the world, which is now compounded by the certification and reporting requirements of USCs and third parties, such as FFIs and NFFEs^[ under the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (“FATCA”).

In short, USCs without a SSN, necessarily cannot be in compliance with U.S. federal tax law.  As I point out in my paper, such –

“A law that cannot be complied with is surely a bad law, the same as a “ . . .law that cannot be enforced is a bad law.”[a]

[a] See, The Case Against Taxing Citizens, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah (March 31, 2010), University of Michigan School of Law, Law & Economics Working Papers.

The paper referenced above explains how difficult it is for USCs residing overseas to ever obtain a SSN.  Specifically, it explains how difficult it is to have an in-person interview at only 18 different locations around the world with a U.S. Department of State employee.  See,  12 Year Old (and Older) U.S. Citizens Residing Outside the U.S. Must Have An “In-Person” Interview in a U.S. Embassy or Consulate for SSN Application in 1 of Just 17 Posts Worldwide

As a USC residing somewhere around the world, you might decide to simply spend the time, money and resources to travel internationally to arrive in the U.S. to apply for a SSN directly with the Social Security Administration within the U.S.  Unfortunately, any USC is now legally prohibited from traveling in or out of the U.S. without a U.S. passport.  There are few exceptions to this general rule, none of which contemplate U.S. federal tax compliance.    See, the relevant excerpts from the white paper:

C.               Travel to the U.S. is Also Not An Option for a USC without a SSN, Due to 22 CFR § 53.1 Requiring a U.S. Passport

A possible solution to this TIN/SSN dilemma may appear to be a trip to the U.S. by the USC to apply for a SSN in the U.S. Unfortunately, this simply creates another dilemma, since the USC must have a U.S. passport to travel to the U.S.   The immigration law regulations 22 CFR § 53.1 require that a U.S. citizen have a U.S. passport to enter or depart the United States. The relevant part of the regulations is § 53.1(a) which provides as follows:

Passport requirement; definitions.

(a) It is unlawful for a citizen of the United States, unless excepted under 22 CFR 53.2,[2] to enter or depart, or attempt to enter or depart, the United States, without a valid U.S. passport.

These regulations were first published in 2006 and unfortunately, simply create another dilemma for the USC residing overseas without a SSN. This additional dilemma is that an application[3] for a U.S. passport requires the individual have a SSN; a vicious circle back to the inability to obtain a SSN.

At the end of the day, the restrictions imposed on USCs make it legally impossible for a USC without a passport to travel to the U.S. (even if they wish they could) to obtain a SSN.

[1] See, IRC § 61 and Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1?1(b) and 1.1?1(a)(1)..

[2] The exceptions set forth in this regulation would not generally be applicable in the case of USCs residing overseas without a SSN.

[3] Application for a U.S. Passport – http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/212239.pdf.

Record Number Gave Up U.S. Citizenship or Long-Term Residency in 2014: WSJ:  By, Laura Saunders (10 Feb. 2015)

*

Her most recent article has a number of excellent observations, including the following regarding an academic study of those citizens living abroad:

According to a recent survey of 1,546 U.S. citizens and former citizens living abroad, 31% of participants have actively considered renouncing their U.S. citizenship and 3% are in the process of doing so. Many who were considering the move cited increasingly onerous and intrusive financial reporting requirements. The survey was conducted between Dec. 5 and Jan. 20 by Amanda Klekowski von Koppenfels, a researcher at the University of Kent in the U.K.

For other articles written by Ms. Laura Saunders, on this related subject, see the Media:  News & Articles section –

Wall Street Journal: Expats Left Frustrated as Banks Cut Services Abroad Americans Overseas Struggle With Implications of Crackdown on Money Laundering and Tax Evasion, (The Wall Street Journal, 11 Sept 2014) By –Laura Saunders

IRS Eases Up on Accidental Tax Cheats:  Agency Lowers Some Offshore-Account Penalties, Raises Others (The Wall Street Journal, June 18, 2014), By – Liam Pleven and Laura Saunders

This is not new news; indeed it is somewhat old and stale. It has become more relevant, however, as the exchange of financial information under FATCA is to commence in a few months in 2015.

The IRS issued a warning in September that reads in relevant part as follows:

IRS Warns Financial Institutions of Scams Designed to Steal FATCA-Related Account Data

WASHINGTON — The Internal Revenue Service today issued a fraud alert for international financial institutions complying with the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA). Scam artists posing as the IRS have fraudulently solicited financial institutions seeking account holder identity and financial account information.

The IRS does not require financial institutions to provide specific account holder identity information or financial account information over the phone or by fax or email. Further, the IRS does not solicit FATCA registration passwords or similar confidential account access information.

This statement may be a bit misleading, since the FATCA law does require specific individual account holder information be provided to the government.  It is detailed in its scope of information required; including account numbers, names of account owners, addresses of account owners, income from such accounts, taxpayer identification numbers (which means Social Security Numbers for U.S. citizens), etc.

Time will tell, how effective governments will be in maintaining their taxpayers’ information confidential; as opposed to private institutions, such as JP Morgan.  See,  JPMorgan data breach entry point identified: NYT

There have been a series of previous posts that discussed the IRS and other government agencies ability to track taxpayers and their assets outside the U.S.

See for instance, the following posts:  Should IRS use Department of Homeland Security to Track Taxpayers Overseas Re: Civil (not Criminal) Tax Matters? The IRS works with Department of Homeland Security with TECs Database to Track Movement of Taxpayers

and  Does the IRS investigate United States Citizens (USCs) and Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs) residing overseas?

Interestingly, the release of IRS internal training manuals and materials (which were obtained through a Freedom of Information Act – FOIA – request) and includes the Power Point slide in this post, describes the TECs database and how it can be used by IRS agents regarding foreign assets and individuals as follows:

The Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS) is a database maintained by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and it is used extensively by the law enforcement community. TECS contains historical travel information such as records of commercial airline flights, border crossings, and specific dates that individuals have traveled to and from the United States.

All this information could provide you with potential leads to pursue.

For example, the discovery of where the taxpayer may hold assets or accounts or where the taxpayer conducts business. It may also assist in determining taxpayer’s residency and the credibility of taxpayer testimony. TECS may have gaps in the information captured, caution is advised. For example, it might contain incomplete information about border crossings, private plane and private boat information. It does not contain enough stand alone data to determine residency. It should be used together with other sources of information.

In addition, the IRS training materials demonstrates the secrecy of the TECs database and what steps the IRS tells their agents to take regarding the TECs database.  The following excerpt directly from the IRS “Matrix Application Training International Individual Compliance:  Basic Structures Part II:  Pre-Audit, Investigative Techniques & Statutes”

 • IRM 5.1.18.14.10 – Covers using TECS Historical Travel Information

First and foremost, do not discuss the existence of TECS with the taxpayers. We must neither confirm nor deny the existence of TECS data.

Those USCs and LPRs who are living in Hong Kong or the Pacific Rim with accounts in the Hong Kong financial sector, need to be aware of the FATCA implications and the Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) that was just signed.

The Hong Kong government’s press release with pictures can be viewed here.  Of course, even those not resident in Asia with accounts, investments, financial instruments and other activities such as private equity funds, will be effected by this IGA.

The U.S. Treasury had announced in May 2014 that Hong Kong had previously ” . . . reached agreements in substance and have consented to being included on this list . . . “

The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) publishes facts about the financial sector that can be reviewed here:

Undoubtedly, numerous companies, entities and trusts with Hong Kong based investments, accounts, funds and financial activities will have U.S. citizen and LPR investors and be subject to reporting under the U.S.-Hong Kong IGA.

There has been much grumbling and lamenting around the world about the U.S. law of FATCA that went into effect in 2014.  See,  Part 1- Unintended Consequences of FATCA – for USCs and LPRs Living Outside the U.S.

For better or worse, FATCA has become the basic model that has driven all of the large economies (some 50+ countries) to move along the same path of automatic exchange of information with countries around the world.  Recent revelations last week of Luxembourg is likely to only increase the political motivation to push forward these efforts.  See, the Guardian’s recent article, Luxembourg tax files: how tiny state rubber-stamped tax avoidance on an industrial scale, (5 Nov 2014, by Simon Bowers).

The OECD is now moving at light-speed, at least compared to the normal speed of the OECD, as its member countries have signed a ” . . . Common Reporting Standard for automatic exchange of tax information, now contained in Part II of the full version of the Standard.  On 6 May 2014, the OECD Declaration on Automatic Exchange of Information in Tax Matters was endorsed by all 34 member countries along with several nonmember countries. . . ”

See the Automatic Exchange of Information programs provided by the OECD in its website

Importantly, and most recently on October 29, 2014, ” . . . 51 jurisdictions, 39 of which were represented at ministerial level, signed a multilateral competent authority agreement to automatically exchange information based on Article 6 of the Multilateral Convention. This agreement specifies the details of what information will be exchanged and when, as set out in the Standard. . . ”

Interestingly, it seems clear that the Common Reporting Standard for automatic exchange of tax information will become the future standard of automatic information.

Technology and a world wide financial sector that is globally connected throughout, allows governments around the world to make these systems possible; for better or for worse.