2023: The Judiciary Takes Center Stage; Professor – Mindy Herzfeld’s article in Tax Notes International –

Professor Herzfeld has an excellent article posted the 18th of December 2023. You can access it here with a paid subscription – titled: 2023: The Judiciary Takes Center Stage. She has lots to cover regarding recent international tax law decisions by the U.S. federal courts (United States Tax Court, Federal District Courts & Court of Federal Claims).

  • Tax Treaties

Professor Mindy Herzfeld discusses our recent case  Aroeste v United States – Order (Nov 2023), which I have discussed at some length in recent posts. See, Federal District Court Rules in Favor of Mexican Citizen – Aroeste vs. United States (LPR) – Tax Treaty Applies: Government’s Motion for Summary Judgment is Denied. It was a pleasure for me to represent Mr. Aroeste over several years and see the favorable outcome of the federal district court that obligates the government to respect the terms of substantive tax treaty law.

She covers Christensen v. United States, which is another tax treaty case regarding the ability to take a foreign tax credit against the Section 1411 tax on net investment income; authored by Judge Marion Blank Horn of the Court of Federal Claims. Judge Horn is no stranger to important international tax issues. She authored the 2002 decision of Estate of Jack vs. United States regarding “domicile” for U.S. estate tax purposes and the impact of the Canadian decedent’s visa status. More recently the Estate of Margaret J. Jones vs. the United States (2022) was a lengthy case of Judge Horn’s denying the Estate a refund. This Estate of Margaret J. Jones is also Canadian citizen (decedent) case; but addressed a very different issue – re: the 5% “miscellaneous offshore penalty” she paid that is identified by the IRS’ rules they created in the “Streamlined Domestic Offshore Procedures” instructions (it is not a treaty case).

  • TCJA, U.S. Trade or Business – SCOTUS & Moore

The Professor also addresses Moore v. United States (which she has written about before) and  Altria Group Inc. v. United States and the subpart F rules under the TCJA.

The recent U.S. Tax Court (USTC) case of YA Global Investments LP v. Commissioner, is discussed by Professor Herzfeld regarding U.S. trade or business activities. Of course, another key USTC case regarding Section 6038 penalties is reviewed which has been appealed by the government – Farhy v. Commissioner. See, Six Weeks, Three International Information Reporting Decisions –

The SCOTUS decision near and dear to my heart (as I personally worked on the ACTEC amicus brief) of Bittner v. United States, is also reviewed briefly by Professor Herzfeld. In that case the SCOTUS held penalties are limited to $10,000 per year for a non-willful violation of the statute (not $2.72 million as the government asserted based upon each account).

She reviews some important transfer pricing cases Coca-Cola Co. v. Commissioner and 3M Co. v. Commissioner.

Do read Professor Herzfeld’s article when you get a chance. More details about her background and how to follow her is set out below:

Mindy Herzfeld is professor of tax practice at University of Florida Levin College of Law, counsel at Potomac Law Group, and a contributor to Tax Notes International. Follow Mindy Herzfeld (@InternationlTax) on X, formerly known as Twitter.

Never in my 30 year career practicing international tax law have I seen the judiciary so active in international tax matters – particularly when you take into consideration various SCOTUS cases. 

Is it too late to comply with the “965 Hammer” (aka the “Transition” or “Repatriation” Tax) for USCs Residing Overseas?

For more background on how Section 965 works, please see,  The “965 Hammer” (aka the “Transition” or “Repatriation” Tax) for USCs Residing Overseas, which explains how U.S. citizens (USC) residing overseas may owe U.S. federal income tax on “phantom income”.  IRS 965 Transition StatementI call it phantom income as it does not need to be received (nor does the USC) need to have any right to it for it to be taxed.

The tax is calculated with reference to (1) the type of assets held in the USC’s foreign corporation (cash or not), and (2) the previously un-taxed earnings of the foreign corporation owned by the USC.

The IRS has a dedicated page on their website to the Section 965 Transition Tax  that provides a basic overview.  The rules are complex and the IRS addressed a set of Q&As to help taxpayers understand how they must report on their tax return; see, Questions and Answers about Reporting Related to Section 965 on 2017 Tax Returns

Normally, USCs combined with other “U.S. persons” need to have greater than 50% of the shares of the foreign corporation to be subject to the 965 Hammer/Repatriation tax.  965 Ownership % Example Procopio Newsletter Eg 3The following example shows how U.S. individuals combined to own 51% cause the foreign corporation to be a “controlled foreign corporation” (CFC) and therefore a “specified foreign corporation” (SFC) that causes the USCs to be subject to the tax on “phantom income” to the extent the company has previously un-taxed earnings.

In contrast, a USC that owns 10% (or 21% or 30%) should not be subject to this tax, as long as the foreign corporation is not a CFC and/or there is no U.S. corporate shareholder that owns 10% or more of the foreign corporation.  The following example (Example 2) shows how a USC that owns 15% and another USC who owns 20% of a foreign corporation, will not be subject to the 965 Hammer, since it is neither a CFC or a SFC.  965 Ownership % Example Procopio Newsletter

Compare that scenario to the following example (Example 1) that shows the somewhat “capricious” nature of how a USC that only owns 10% in a different fact pattern of ownership, can still be subject to the 965 Hammer repatriation tax.  This is true, even when other U.S. owners have a mere 11% ownership (but in this case it is a U.S. corporate owner with >=10%),  causing it to be a SFC and therefore triggering the 965 Hammer/repatriation tax: 965 Ownership % Example Procopio Newsletter Eg 1

In this last example, the USC owns only 10% of the shares of the foreign corporation, but since a U.S. corporate shareholder owns at least 10% of the shares of the same foreign corporation, all U.S. shareholders are subject to the 965 Hammer/repatriation tax.

There are some silver linings to this tax.

First, the tax rate applicable (8% in the case of non-cash assets) can be much lower than the normal statutory rate on dividend distributions.

Second, since the tax is mandatory (hopefully at a lower rate as cash and cash equivalents carry out a 15.5% higher tax rate), it can provide an opportunity to restructure and/or repatriate profits of the foreign corporation.  This can give liquidity in the hands of the USC shareholder who was otherwise deterred from making actual dividend distributions or investing in U.S. property (which is in itself normally deemed a dividend to the USC shareholder) for foreign corporations that are “CFCs.”

Maybe USCs residing overseas will want to restructure their business operations to obtain specific tax advantages from the federal tax reform (e.g., 21% or 13.25% corporate tax rates that can be applicable for U.S. corporate taxpayers)?

Third, the statute allows the taxpayer to make a timely election (under Section 965(h)(1)) to defer the payment of the tax over many an eight (8) year period as follows:965 installment schedule

There are no circumstances where a USC would not want to defer the payment of the tax over time?  Why pay for something today, when you can pay it tomorrow without an interest carrying charge?

For instance, if the total 965 Hammer/repatriation tax is US$200,000 for a USC, why would she not want to pay only 8% or US$16,000 in 2017/2018 and defer the rest of the US$200,000 tax payments over time?

The payments are “back-loaded” in later years and do not carry an interest charge.

Also, the IRS granted further relief for individuals who owe less than US$1M of 965 Hammer/repatriation tax.  This relief allows the payment/deferral of the first installment otherwise due in 2017 until 2018 (and will not trigger the full amount immediately due), provided all of the following are satisfied:

  • a timely election under Section 965(h)(1) needs to have been made, which is typically extends the return due date until October 15, 2018 (USCs residing outside the U.S., the extension due date was June 15th, 2018 and requires the filing of a specific automatic extension form (IRS Form 4868) by that date); and
  • pays the first installment by the due date of of the 2017 tax return, without regard to extensions (which will typically be June 15th, 2018 provided the USC is residing overseas).

Bottom line:  a USC who has timely filed an extension to file their IRS Form 1040 individual income tax return by June 15th, still has time to timely file the election under Section 965(h)(1) to defer the payment of the 965 Hammer/repatriation tax.

Incidentally, the Treasury published proposed regulations at the beginning of last month on Section 965 –  Treasury Announces Guidance on One-Time Repatriation Tax on Foreign Earnings

Mr. Dewees gets Smacked! U.S. District Court Upholds Multiple $10,000 Penalties (US$120,000 – NO Forms 5471) for USC Residing in Canada

United States Citizens (“USCs”) and lawful permanent residents (“LPRs”) residing overseas should read the story of Mr. Dewees to learn what could happen if they go into the offshore voluntary disclosure program (“OVDP”); when he appears to have been a “good faith” taxpayer.  The IRS issued a press release in March 2018 – IRS to end offshore voluntary disclosure program; Taxpayers with undisclosed foreign assets urged to come forward now  The IRS explained that it will close the program next montNorth America Maph on September 28, 2018.  Take the story of the Dewees into consideration before rushing into the OVDP.

This is not a new case, as the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia issued its opinion a year ago – Dewees v. United States, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124989 (D.C. D.C. 2017).  However, it is an important case if anyone is confused about whether they should go into the OVDP.  See the story of the Dewees.

Mr. Dewees resided in Canada and did file U.S. income tax returns, but not all information returns. See a related previous post –  Why Most U.S. Citizens Residing Overseas Haven’t a Clue about the Labyrinth of U.S. Taxation and Bank and Financial Reporting of Worldwide Income and Assets

He also did not initially pay information reporting penalties assessed by the IRS regarding his Canadian company.   He resided in Canada where is business and company was located.  The Court noted that he “. . . voluntarily disclosed [to the IRS] his failure to file the required informational returns . . . ”  The Dewees were “rewarded” by their good faith efforts by the IRS which then turned around and ” . . .  assessed a statutory penalty of $120,000, $10,000 for each year of non-compliance . . . “

The Canadian revenue authority would not refund his Canadian tax refund until the IRS penalty was paid in full.  He eventually paid $120,000 of information penalties and brought a suit for refund in U.S. District Court.

The U.S. District Court first explained the obligations of USCs residing overseas with –

(i) controlling interests in foreign corporations (i.e., filing obligations under IRC IRS Form 5471 - page 1Section 6038 to file IRS Form 5471) – see an earlier related post Many Canadians have expressed frustration with U.S. tax policy of worldwide taxation of U.S. citizens., and

(ii) interests in foreign financial accounts (i.e., filing obligations of foreign bank account reports under Title 31) see a previous post, Nuances of FBAR – Foreign Bank Account Report Filings – for USCs and LPRs living outside the U.S.

The Court then dismissed the suit for refund on the grounds that Mr. Dewees failed to state a viable claim and the Court therefore lacked jurisdiction to hear his claims (which were “excessive fines”, “equal protection” and “due process” claims).

Here, the USC residing in Canada was apparently well intended, since the District Court said that Mr. “Dewees learned that he had failed to comply with these requirements . . . ” In another part of the opinion, the Court uses the word “neglected” to file information returns for over a decade.

Learned” and “neglected” certainly does not sound intentional, which is probably why the IRS did not attempt to pursue Title 31 willfulness FBAR penalties.

The USC entered the OVDP on the advice of a tax specialist and then withdrew after the IRS was proposing to assess an “OVDP in-lieu of penalty” of US$185,862.  Chart - OVDI Article Martin Ferreira

The IRS ultimately did not pursue any FBAR penalties in this case, not even the annual $10,000 per year penalty for failure to file the FBAR form.

Had Mr. Dewees lived in any other country (other than Canada) he probably would not have had the local taxman (i.e., the Canada Revenue Agency) step in to indirectly help the IRS collect the penalty amounts assessed.  See an earlier post,  U.S. Enforcement/Collection of Taxes Overseas against USCs and LPRs – Legal Limitations

The U.S.-Canada income tax treaty has a special “assistance in collection” provision, which provides in part as follows –

Article XXVI A
Assistance in Collection
1. The Contracting States  [referring to the U.S. and Canada] undertake to lend assistance to each other in the collection of taxes
referred to in paragraph 9, together with interest, costs, additions to such taxes and civil penalties, referred to in this Article as a “revenue claim”. 

I explained in an earlier post, how the “Revenue Rule” was a common law concept that generally prohibited the U.S. government from assisting in the collection of taxes of Passport Inside Back Page - USC Taxation Referenceanother country.  Hence, the U.S. Treasury renegotiated the treaties with five countries (including Canada) that now have a specific treaty provision such as XXVI A above:

As a result of these cases and the Revenue Rule, the U.S. and Canada modified their income tax treaty to (at least in theory) allow for the international enforcement of taxes.  The U.S. now has five income treaties with “mutual assistance” provisions: Canada, Sweden, France, Denmark, and the Netherlands (with a clause in the newly negotiated, but yet to go into force, Swiss treaty).

In the Dewees case, we learned that the assistance in collection provision is not merely a theoretical tool that can be used in collecting taxes.  The actions of both the Canadian (CRA) and U.S. governments (IRS and District Court Judge), made the provision effective.   The US$120,000 penalty, that has nothing to do with any U.S. taxes, was collected by the IRS.

Questions to ponder in this case:

  1. Would the USC have been better off, by getting proper advice as to how to file on a going forward basis?
  2. Why did the USC ever go into the OVDP program in the first place under these facts?
  3. Did the USC know about the “streamlined” filing procedures of the IRS for U.S. Taxpayers Residing Outside the United States?
    • In this case, the program did not exist at the time the taxpayers went into the OVDP in 2009.
  4. Why did Dewees not simply consider (assuming he had good faith facts) filing amended tax returns to include late filed IRS Form 5471 forms?
  5. Why did the IRS aggressively pursue these $120,000 in information penalties (presumably because he opted out of the OVDP program and they like to make examples out of those taxpayers that leave the program)?
  6. Would and will the IRS assess more $10,000 per year penalties for additional companies for a good faith failure to file IRS Form 5471 forms?  In other words, what if the Dewees had four Canadian companies, would the IRS have assessed US$480,000 (US$10,000 per year X 4 – per company – X 12 – the number of years the form was not filed)?
  7. Will the IRS have success with any other country that does not have a similar tax treaty provision on the collection of taxes as the unique U.S.-Canada provision?
    • What about Sweden, France, Denmark, and the Netherlands with specific provisions in the U.S. income tax treaties?  See a discussion of the U.S. District Court case in Georgia involving a Danish citizen, Torben Dileng v. Commissioner as discussed by Keith Fogg in the Procedurally Taxing Blog
  8. Will the aggressive actions of the IRS in this Dewee case to collect penalties backfire?  Will USCs residing overseas be less likely to go into specific IRS programs for fear of being smacked down to the tune of US$120,000 (plus legal fees and costs) for merely neglecting to file information returns when no U.S. taxes are even owing?

Revocation or Denial of U.S. Passport: More on new section 7345 (Title 26/IRC) and USCs with “Seriously Delinquent Tax Debt”

New Section 7345 completely modifies how U.S. citizens (“USCs”) living and traveling around the world have to now consider very seriously actions taken by the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”).  It is the IRS which now holds the power under this new law that requires the U.S. Department of State (“DOS”) to revoke or deny to issue a U.S. passport in the first place.

US Citizens Who Renounced - Chart Qtr 3 - 2015

New Section 7345(e) provides in relevant part as follows:  “upon receiving a certification described in section 7345 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 from the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of State shall not issue a passport to any individual who has a seriously delinquent tax debt described in such section. . . ” [emphasis added].

This new law mandates (not at the discretion of the DOS) that various U.S. passports be denied at the direction of the IRS.  Once the IRS issues the certification of “seriously delinquent tax debt.”

All it takes, is for the IRS to claim tax or penalties are owing of at least US$50,000 through an assessment (plus start a lien or levy action).

Of course, US$50,000 sounds like a large sum for many modest USCs, until an individual understands that there are a host of international reporting requirements for taxpayers.  Specifically, the IRS can impose a US$10,000 penalty for each violation of failing to complete and file various IRS information forms; EVEN IF NO income IRS Form 8938 Specified Foreign Financial Assets - Highlighted Markertaxes are owing.  See IRS website – FAQs 5 and 8 regarding civil penalties (see also How is the offshore voluntary disclosure program really working? Not well for USCs and LPRs living overseas).

For a summary of these forms and filing requirements, see a prior post, Oct. 17, 2015, Part II: C’est la vie Ms. Lucienne D’Hotelle! Tax Timing Problems for Former U.S. Citizens is Nothing New – the IRS and the Courts Have Decided Similar Issues in the Past (Pre IRC Section 877A(g)(4))

Indeed, our office has seen and assisted numerous taxpayers around the world where the IRS has assessed tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands and in some cases in excess of US$1M (in proposed assessments) against an individual for failure to simply file information reporting forms.  See, for instance, a prior post on Nov. 2, 2015, Why Most U.S. Citizens Residing Overseas Haven’t a Clue about the Labyrinth of U.S. Taxation and Bank and Financial Reporting of Worldwide Income and Assets

Also, we have seen several IRS assessments of income tax (not just penalties) against individuals of hundreds of thousands of dollars which are not supported by the law.  For instance, it is not uncommon for the IRS to issue a “substitute for return” alleging income taxes owing.  See, How the IRS Can file a “Substitute for Return” for those USCs and LPRs Residing Overseas,  posted Nov. 8, 2015.  We have a number of those cases pending, where the IRS has taken erroneous information and made such assessments against USCs residing and working outside the U.S. for much if not most of their professional lives.US Passport

New Section 7345 requires that USCs, wherever they might reside, take great care in knowing about any actions the IRS might be taking against them; as to tax and penalty assessments, whether or not they are supported under the law.

One basic method of learning more about the activities of the IRS is to make a transcript request directly to the IRS regarding the status of a USC’s federal tax status according to IRS records.  See, IRM, Part 21. Customer Account Services . . . Section 3. Transcripts.

It is also possible for the USC to obtain additional tax information from the IRS through a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request.

U.S. Citizens Overseas are Often Ill Advised to go into the (1) OVDP and sometimes even the (2) the Streamlined Filing Procedure

There have been prior posts discussing what is referred to as the offshore voluntary disclosure program (“OVDP”) and what the IRS later created – the so-called “streamlined program” filing procedure.

For more background, see, GAO Yr2014 Report on Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program Indicates Less Than 4% of Taxpayers Lived Outside the U.S., posted March 11, 2014.

Importantly, these OVDP and streamlined programs created by the IRS are not creatures of any statutory law, for instance Title 26 (the Internal Revenue Code) or Title 31 (the so-called Bank Secrecy Act); or any law for that matter.  There are no court cases or Treasury Regulations that spell out the terms of these programs as part of any legal framework.IRS Form 1040 p1

I like to say they are similar to the Hasbro rules of “Monopoly”; a game I was fond of as a child.  The IRS is like Hasbro in that they can change the rules of the game as they wish, and often do in the form of publicized frequently asked questions (“FAQs”).  The IRS submits these rules of their game and ask, encourage and in some cases (in my view) browbeat taxpayers, often times through their advisers, into participating.  See some of the various rule changes below –

The above reflect just some of the modifications and rules the IRS has made, and keeps making to their rules of their proposed OVDP structure; which again, I repeat, is not part of the law.

Many taxpayers and their advisers, in my view have not thought carefully about the law and its application; but rather have focused on the “Monopoly” rules.  They cite and read the FAQs if that is somehow the law!  See  posted May 10, 2014 and The 2013 GAO Report  of the IRS Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program, International Tax Journal, CCH Wolters Kluwer, January-February 2014.   PDF version here.Taxpayer Advocate Report re Form 8938 and Duplicate Reporting - Graph

Similarly, the streamlined filing procedures is not part of the law, and also has been modified several times by the IRS.  Fortunately, the IRS realized that U.S. taxpayers residing outside the U.S. are not the same as those who reside in the U.S. when they created two separate programs last year in 2014.

See, U.S. Taxpayers Residing Outside the United States: The following streamlined procedures are referred to as the Streamlined Foreign Offshore Procedures.  Eligibility for the Streamlined Foreign Offshore Procedures

The point of this post is that I have seen numerous cases where U.S. citizens residing around the world were ill advised to participate in the OVDP.  In short, if an individual has no criminal tax liability, I think there is little purpose or reason for almost all USC overseas to participate into the OVDP.  Analyzing thoughtfully the facts of each case and the law (not the Monopoly rules) is what is important for each individual.

Finally, a clear understanding of what are the Monopoly rules compared to the law is crucial when advising USCs residing overseas.  Sometimes, filing through the streamlined procedure might be well advised for a particular taxpayer; e.g., if they would otherwise have substantial late payment and late filing penalties.  However, there are plenty of cases where simply filing tax returns pursuant to the law will be preferable in a particular case.  This is a process that needs to be thoughtfully considered in each case with a clear understanding of the law – not just the Monopoly rules.

For some related commentary on this topic, see the following posts:

Why Most U.S. Citizens Residing Overseas Haven’t a Clue about the Labyrinth of U.S. Taxation and Bank and Financial Reporting of Worldwide Income and Assets

This post is written simply because so many U.S. citizens residing overseas are reasonably confused about the complexity of U.S. tax law.  The mere requirement to file U.S. income tax returns for those overseas often comes as a great surprise.  My non-U.S. born wife is an exception (as she also lives outside the U.S.) simply because I have repeatedly told her for our 20 some years of marriage.  IRS Form W-7 Highlighted

Some in the IRS erroneously think U.S. citizens residing overseas do and should understand U.S. tax law.  I posed one simple scenario to a very sophisticated IRS attorney not very long ago who specializes in the FATCA rules.

Her view is (hopefully was) that U.S. citizens throughout the world know or should know the U.S. tax laws because the instructions to IRS Form 1040 are clear.

This thought knocked me off my figurative chair onto the floor!  Smack. 

My surprise is based upon my own experience working with individuals and families throughout the world, in numerous countries.  I have noticed a number of notions, based upon these andectodal experiences as follows:

  1. A minority of U.S. citizens (unless they lived most of their lives in the U.S. and recently moved overseas as an “expatriate”) have no real basic idea of how the U.S. federal tax laws work; let alone to their assets and income in their country of residence.  See USCs and LPRs Living Outside the U.S. – Key Tax and BSA Forms
  2. There are indeed plenty of immigrant U.S. residents (certainly less than 50% by my own experience – especially when concepts of PFICs and foreign tax credits start being discussed) who even understand the basics of U.S. international tax law.
  3. If they reside in an English speaking country that has relatively strong family or historical ties to the U.S. (e.g., England, Ireland, Scotland, and Canada, etc.) they are likely to have a better idea of the U.S. federal tax laws, but still the majority don’t know key concepts.  See, Nuances of FBAR – Foreign Bank Account Report Filings – for USCs and LPRs living outside the U.S.
  4. Even those in English speaking countries that have less historical or family ties to the U.S. have a lesser understanding (e.g., New Zealand, Australia, Kenya, South Africa, India, etc.).US Passport
  5. Those who do not speak English know even less about U.S. tax laws and how they apply to them.
  6. Many individuals who learn of these requirements overseas are sometimes driven to great despair.  The message they receive is not a correct one under the law in my view: as they read IRS materials (for instance, see FAQs 5, 6 and and former 51.2 from the Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program Frequently Asked Questions and Answers 2014) and come to the conclusion they will soon be going to jail, criminally prosecuted or otherwise be subject to tens of thousands of dollars worth of penalties for their failure to file a range of tax forms.
  7. Literally, sometimes as a tax lawyer I feel more like a psychologist, when these individuals come to me saying they can’t sleep, they can’t eat, they are seeing a cardiologist for high blood pressure, etc. and even in a most extreme case they thought suicide was a solution.  See, How is the offshore voluntary disclosure program really working? Not well for USCs and LPRs living overseas.
  8. Individuals around the world (even tax professionals) and certainly laypeople, are not commonly reading TaxAnalysts (nor would they subscribe) or other tax professional publications that explain many of the intricacies of U.S. tax laws.
  9. Learning and understanding U.S. tax laws, including just the basics, requires a great deal of time, aptitude for nuances and details, literacy, patience and a level of aptitude for such matters that simply escape many people around the world (most I would say).  see, “PFICs” – What is a PFIC – and their Complications for USCs and LPRs Living Outside the U.S.  I can relate to this personally, as I am an international tax professional (indeed I even studied a post graduate law course outside the U.S. in a non-English language), have spent my entire professional career of more than 25 years in the area, and yet only generally have a very superficial understanding of tax laws throughout the countries where I am dealing with clients.  I don’t try to understand the details of those laws. Chart of Trends - US Citizenship Renunications Qtr 3 - 2015
  10. Many people are angry and frustrated (justifiably so, in my view, in many cases) after learning they are subject to these rules.  See comment above about being a psychologist.  Plus, USCs and LPRs residing outside the U.S. – and IRS Form 8938. In addition, see, Taxpayer Advocate Report on Burdens of Benign Taxpayers who Make Mistakes

Back to the intelligent IRS tax attorney.  My question to her was:  “Why would you, as a U.S. born individual not be reviewing the tax laws, tax forms and tax instructions of the country where your parents were born prior to immigrating to the U.S.?”  I asked:  “Are you not reviewing those laws in the original language of your parents (not English, but the other language of your parent’s country) to understand what tax forms and returns you should be filing?”

The IRS attorney’s response was:  “What:  of course, I am not reviewing such tax forms or filing information or tax laws, as I would have no tax obligations in that foreign country where I have no income, no assets or no bank or financial accounts!”

My follow-up question was a simple one:  “Don’t you realize that U.S. federal tax law (Title 26) and financial bank reporting laws (Title 31) do just that!”

“Hmm she paused: how can that be?”  I don’t recall if she said this out loud, or just said it with her puzzled expression.

The answer of course is that through citizenship (including derivative citizenship through a U.S. parent even though the child never spent a single day of residence in the U.S., let alone received any income or assets); that same individual in the mirror position as that IRS attorney is subject to a host of U.S. federal tax and financial reporting laws.  See,

Here is the big disconnect.    It’s not just among the ill-informed or those lesser educated on the fine points of law.  I had the pleasure this week along with my wife to host two educated, worldly and engaging individuals who have been married some 20 years together.  They are well read and highly educated.  Both are lawyers by training, one practices law that often pushes him fairly deeply into the tax law and his wife is a wonderful and experienced judge in the California state courts.

I asked them (as I like to ask people around the world) if they had ever heard or understood that the U.S. federal tax law imposes taxation and very detailed reporting on the worldwide income and assets of U.S. citizens who reside outside the U.S.  I discussed Civil War ImageCook v. Tait and the U.S. Civil War a bit.  See both Supreme Court’s Decision in Cook vs. Tait and Notification Requirement of Section 7701(a)(50) and The U.S. Civil War is the Origin of U.S. Citizenship Based Taxation on Worldwide Income for Persons Living Outside the U.S. ***Does it still make sense?

All of it was a great surprise to them! They were in utter shock and both are residents in the U.S., highly educated in the law and are like the vast majority of the world, including U.S. citizens who reside outside the U.S.

This is the common response for many U.S. citizens residing overseas.

IRS Attorney – Dan Price, Provides Specific Recommendations for U.S. Citizen Taxpayers Overseas at USD – Procopio International Tax Institute

Tax Analyst’s reported some of the key comments made by IRS Attorney Dan Price at the 11th Annual University of San Diego School of Law – Procopio International Tax Institute.  The course panel he discussed was – Course 10: Current Practical Problems for Taxpayers in OVDP and Streamlined.IRS Form 1040 p1

The article written by Ms. Amanda Athanasiou provided good coverage of comments from IRS Office of Chief Counsel Attorney Dan Price about the streamlined procedure.  See, the complete article that was published October 27, 2015, Confusion Over Offshore Accounts Prompts IRS Response, Worldwide Tax Daily and Tax Notes Today: News Stories.

The common fact pattern is that many U.S. citizens around the world have simply not filed U.S. federal income tax returns.  Many of them were unaware of the requirements and/or they thought in good faith they were not required to file since their income levels were below the “foreign earned income” exclusion amounts.  See a prior post, March 24, 2014, The Foreign Earned Income Exclusion is Only Available If a U.S. Income Tax Return is Filed. 

The streamlined procedure for U.S. citizens residing overseas does not require that they have previously filed U.S. income tax returns.  See, U.S. Taxpayers Residing Outside the United States: The following streamlined procedures are referred to as the Streamlined Foreign Offshore Procedures.  Eligibility for the Streamlined Foreign Offshore Procedures

Incidentally, with a record number of citizenship renunciations reported just a few days ago (more than 1,400 in the latest quarter – Quarterly Publication of Individuals, Who Have Chosen To Expatriate, as Required by Section 6039G, Oct. 27, 2015) this is particularly important to U.S. citizens living all around the world.

One particularly salient quote regarding the streamlined procedure from Mr. Price was, “The IRS is going to presume the taxpayer was non-willful unless facts indicate otherwise.”

One of the important questions that U.S. citizens overseas face is whether their particular facts indicate they would be better off by simply filing initial or amended tax returns.   There are also so-called “qualified amended returns” which will be discussed in another post.

Neither the federal tax law nor the Treasury Regulations provide that a taxpayer has an affirmative statutory duty to file an amended income tax return, as long the original return reflects a good faith effort to comply with the law at the time the tax return was originally filed.  The Treasury Regulations, which are drafted by the IRS, instruct that a taxpayer “should,” within the period of limitation, amend to correct prior errors in a tax return, but not that a taxpayer “must” amend.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.451-1(a). Front Page - of FBAR Electronic Instructions

When a taxpayer fails to file a tax return by the due date, the taxpayer may be subject to failure to file and failure to pay penalties and interest charges.  See IRC Section 6561; IRC Section 6601.  The real problem can be that if a taxpayer fails to file a return voluntarily, the IRS may file a substitute return for the taxpayer instead, including on the basis of information received by third parties.  See IRC Section 6020.  This substitute return may not give the taxpayer credit for deductions and exemptions they are entitled to.  Substitute returns prepared by the IRS are valid for calculating a taxpayer’s income tax deficiencies and penalties for failure to file and failure to pay. See Holloway v. Commissioner,  T.C. Memo. 2012-137; see also Brewer v. U.S., 764 F. Supp. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).

However, at the end of the day, those U.S. citizens residing overseas who were/are not aware of the U.S. federal tax law filing requirements have not committed a “mortal sin” in the vernacular of the Roman Catholic Church.  Indeed, in these circumstances, they have probably only exposed themselves to penalties (late payment, late filing, etc.) which are based upon the amount of tax owing.  Of course, the IRS does sometimes use the stick of international information reporting penalties over the head of taxpayers.  See, excellent summary by the American Citizens Abroad, Delinquent FBAR and Tax Filing Penalties

The question is:  “Streamlined (to be) or not Streamlined, i.e., just file returns (not to be)”?

Part II: C’est la vie Ms. Lucienne D’Hotelle! Tax Timing Problems for Former U.S. Citizens is Nothing New – the IRS and the Courts Have Decided Similar Issues in the Past (Pre IRC Section 877A(g)(4))

This is Part II, a follow-on discussion of older U.S. case law and IRS rulings that address how and when individuals are subject to U.S. taxation before and after they assert they are no longer U.S. citizens.

I might point out that I am of the belief that we humans always like to hear the news we want to hear; and/or interpret it in the way we find most beneficial to us.  Who doesn’t like good news versus bad news?  Whether we (laypeople and tax lawyers alike) interpret Section 877A(g)(4) in any particular way; it is of no real consequence when it is the IRS that will enforce the law and ultimately the Department of Justice, Tax Division who will handle any such case interpreting this provision before a U.S. District Court or the Court of Federal Claims.  For those who have not litigated before these Courts and seen how aggressive are the government lawyers in advocating for the government, the following discussion will hopefully be illustrative.

See, Part I: Tax Timing Problems for Former U.S. Citizens is Nothing New – the IRS and the Courts Have Decided Similar Issues in the Past (Pre IRC Section 877A(g)(4)), dated October 16, 2015.

The question is what is the correct date of “relinquishment of citizenship” as defined in the statute; IRC Section 877A(g)(4)?  Many argue the law cannot be applied retroactively?

However, the specific case discussed here, did just that; applied the law retroactively to determine U.S. citizenship status of an individual and corresponding tax obligations.  This was also in a time of a much simpler tax code with (i) no international information reporting requirements (e.g., IRS Forms 8938, 8858, 5471, 8865, 3520, 3520-A, 926, 8621, etc.), (ii) no Title 31 “FBAR” reporting requirements and (iii) no constant drumbeat by the IRS of international taxpayers and enforcement.  See, recent announcement by IRS on Oct. 16, 2015 (one day after tax returns were required to be filed by many) Offshore Compliance Programs Generate $8 Billion; IRS Urges People to Take Advantage of Voluntary Disclosure Programs.  However, for cautionary posts on the IRS OVDP and the deceptive numbers published (e.g., “$8 Billion”), see  posted May 10, 2014 and The 2013 GAO Report  of the IRS Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program, International Tax Journal, CCH Wolters Kluwer, January-February 2014.   PDF version here.

Of course, the answer to this question helps determine if and when will the individual be subject to the federal tax laws of the U.S. on their worldwide income and global assets.  In the case of Ms. Lucienne D’Hotelle (an interesting 1977 appellate opinion from the firs circuit) she had spent little time in the U.S. and had sent a letter in her native language French to the U.S. Department of State, which stated “I have never considered myself to be a citizen of the United States.”  This is  not unlike many individuals around the world today;  at least as of late – in the era of FATCA, who assert they are not a U.S. citizen because they “relinquish[ed] it by the performance of certain expatriating acts with the required “intent” to give up the US citizenship” and did not notify the U.S. federal government.

The Court nevertheless found Ms. Lucienne D’Hotelle retroactively subject to U.S. income taxation on her non-U.S. source income (up until she received a certificate of loss of nationality from the Department of State); for specific years even when the immigration law provisions of the day said she was no longer a U.S. citizen during that same retroactive period.

There have been many contemporary commentators who argue an individual does not need to (i) have, (ii) do, or (iii) receive any of the following, and yet still should be able to successfully argue they have shed themselves of U.S. citizenship and hence the obligations of U.S. taxation and reporting on their worldwide income and global assets –

(i) receive a U.S. federal government issued document (e.g., a certificate of loss of nationality “CLN” per 877A(g)(4)(C)),

(ii) receive a cancelation of a naturalized citizen’s certificate of naturalization by a U.S. court (per 877A(g)(4)(D)),

(iii) provide a signed statement of voluntary relinquishment from the individual to the U.S. Department of State (per 877A(g)(4)(B)), or

(iv) provide proof of an in person renunciation before a diplomatic or consular officer of the U.S. (per  paragraph (5) of section 349(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1481(a)(5)), in accordance with 877A(g)(4)(C)).

Some older tax cases that interpreted similar concepts are worthy of consideration.  They will certainly be in any brief of the attorneys for the U.S. Department of Justice, Tax Division and/or Chief Counsel lawyers for the IRS in any case where the individual challenges that none of the above items are required in their particular case to avoid U.S. taxation and reporting requirements.Graph - Foreign Earned Income By Country - IRS Report

The D’Hotelle case is illustrative of the efforts taken by the Department of Justice, Tax Division in collecting U.S. income tax on a naturalized citizen.  You will notice they did not take a sympathetic approach to her case.   Ms. Lucienne D’Hotelle was born in France in 1909 and died in 1968 in France, yet the U.S. government continued to pursue collection of U.S. income taxation on her foreign source income from the Dominican Republic, France and apparently Puerto Rico even after her death during a period of time when she used a U.S. passport.  Lucienne D’Hotelle de Benitez Rexach, 558 F.2d 37 (1st Cir.1977).  She, not unlike many individuals today, claimed she was not a U.S. citizen – or at least stated “I have never considered myself to be a citizen of the United States.

Some of the particularly interesting facts relevant to Ms. D’Hotelle, a naturalized citizen, which are relevant to the question of U.S. taxation of citizens, were set forth in the appellate court’s decision as follows:

Lucienne D’Hotelle was born in France in 1909. She became Lucienne D’Hotelle de Benitez Rexach upon her marriage to Felix in San Juan, Puerto Rico in 1928. She was naturalized as a United States citizen on December 7, 1942. The couple spent some time in the Dominican Republic, where Felix engaged in harbor construction projects. Lucienne established a residence in her native France on November 10, 1946 and remained a resident until May 20, 1952. During that time s 404(b) of the Nationality Act of 19402 provided that naturalized citizens who returned to their country of birth and resided there for three years lost their American citizenship. On November 10, 1947, after Lucienne had been in France for one year, the American Embassy in Paris issued her a United States passport valid through November 9, 1949. Soon after its expiration Lucienne applied in Puerto Rico for a renewal. By this time she had resided in France for three years.

                                         * * *

On May 20, 1952, the Vice-Consul there signed a Certificate of Loss of Nationality, citing Lucienne’s continuous residence in France as having automatically divested her of citizenship under s 404(b). Her passport . . . was confiscated, cancelled and never returned to her. The State Department approved the certificate on December 23, 1952. Lucienne made no attempt to regain her American citizenship; neither did she affirmatively renounce it.

                                         * * *

Predictably, the United States eventually sought to tax Lucienne for her half of that income. Whether by accident or design, the government’s efforts began in earnest shortly after the Supreme Court invalidated *40 the successor statute4 to s 404(b). In in Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964), the Court held that the distinction drawn by the statute between naturalized and native-born Americans was so discriminatory as to violate due process. In January 1965, about two months after this suit was filed, the State Department notified Lucienne by letter that her expatriation was void under Schneider and that the State Department considered her a citizen. Lucienne replied that she had accepted her denaturalization without protest and had thereafter considered herself not to be an American citizen.

There are other facts that make clear the government was not fond of her husband, the income that he earned and how he managed his and his wife’s assets during and after her death.  The Court also discusses at length the fact that she had used a U.S. passport during the years when she alleges she was not a U.S. citizen.  The Court goes on to analyze her U.S. citizenship, and the following discussions are illustrative of the ultimate tax consequences.

LUCIENNE’S CITIZENSHIP

The government contends that Lucienne was still an American citizen from her third anniversary as a French resident until the day the Certificate of Loss of Nationality was issued in Nice. This case presents a curious situation, since usually it is the individual who claims citizenship and the government which denies it. But pocketbook considerations occasionally reverse the roles. United States v. Matheson, 532 F.2d 809 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied 429 U.S. 823, 97 S.Ct. 75, 50 L.Ed.2d 85 (1976). The government’s position is that under either Schneider v. Rusk, supra, or Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 87 S.Ct. 1660, 18 L.Ed.2d 757 (1967), the statute by which Lucienne was denaturalized is unconstitutional and its prior effects should be wiped out. Afroyim held that Congress lacks the power to strip persons of citizenship merely *41 because they have voted in a foreign election. The cornerstone of the decision is the proposition that intent to relinquish citizenship is a prerequisite to expatriation.

12 Section 404(b) would have been declared unconstitutional under either Schneider or Afroyim. The statute is practically identical to its successor, which Schneider condemned as discriminatory. Section 404(b) would have been invalid under Afroyim as a congressional attempt to expatriate regardless of intent. Likewise it is clear that the determination of the Vice-Consul and the State Department in 1952 would have been upheld under then prevailing case law, even though Lucienne had manifested no intent to renounce her citizenship. Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 36 S.Ct. 106, 60 L.Ed. 297 (1915). Accord, Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491, 70 S.Ct. 292, 94 L.Ed. 287 (1950). See also Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 78 S.Ct. 568, 2 L.Ed.2d 603 (1958), overruled, Afroyim v. Rusk, supra.

411 F.Supp. at 1293. However, the district court went too far in viewing the equities as between Lucienne and the government in strict isolation from broad policy considerations which argue for a generally retrospective application of Afroyim and Schneider to the entire class of persons invalidly expatriated. Cf. Linkletter v. Walker, supra. The rights stemming from American citizenship are so important that, absent special circumstances, they must be recognized even for years past. Unless held to have been citizens without interruption, persons wrongfully expatriated as well as their offspring might be permanently and unreasonably barred from important benefits.6 Application of Afroyim or Schneider is generally appropriate.* * *

During the interval from late 1949 to mid-1952, Lucienne was unaware that she had been automatically denaturalized.                                        

* * *

Fairness dictates that the United States recover income taxes for the period November 10, 1949 to May 20, 1952. Lucienne was privileged to travel on a United States passport; she received the protection of its government.
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It’s quite interesting that the Court uses and focuses on fairness as to the U.S. government, more than a discussion of “fairness” to the individual.  The use of the passport seems to be an integral fact.  Here, the Court determined she was retroactively a U.S. citizen and hence subject to taxation on her worldwide income during those crucial periods (1949 through 1952) even though (1) the U.S. Department of State said she was not a U.S. citizen during that time, and (2) she stated “I have never considered myself to be a citizen of the United States.” 
_
101112 Although the government has not appealed the decision with respect to taxes from mid-1952 through 1958, the district court was presented with the issue. We wish to explain why the government should be allowed to collect taxes for the two and one-half year interval but not for the subsequent period. The letter from Lucienne to the Department of State official in 1965, which appears in English translation in the record, states that after the Certificate of Loss of Nationality, “I have never considered myself to be a citizen of the United States.” We think that in this case this letter can be construed as an acceptance and voluntary relinquishment of citizenship. We also find that in this particular case estoppel would have been proper against the United States. Although estoppel is rarely a proper defense against the government, there are instances where it would be unconscionable to allow the government to reverse an earlier position. Schuster v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 312 F.2d 311, 317 (9th Cir. 1962). This is one of those instances. Lucienne cannot be dunned for taxes to support the United States government during the years in which she was denied its protection. In Peignand v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 440 F.2d 757 (1st Cir. 1971), this court refused to decide whether estoppel could apply against the government. A decision on the question was unnecessary, since the petitioner had not been led to take a course of action he would not otherwise have taken. Id. at 761. Here, Lucienne severed her ties to this country at the direction of the State Department. The right hand will not be permitted to demand payment for something which the left hand has taken away. However, until her citizenship was snatched from her, Lucienne should have expected to honor her 1952 declaration that she was a taxpayer.
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Of particular note, the Court highlighted that the Department of State (one hand) cannot take away citizenship, the individual’s passport and issue a certificate of loss of nationality (“CLN”), and the IRS (on the other hand) impose taxation for the time period after the CNL was issued.
One point of emphasis by the Court was how U.S. citizenship rights are a highly protected right; as articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court.  That high protection granted, serves to aid those individuals who defend against a government arguing they somehow ceased to be a U.S. citizen.  Of course, for those trying to escape U.S. taxation, the result is not a desired one. . . a curious situation, since usually it is the individual who claims citizenship and the government which denies it. . . “
C’est la vie Ms. Lucienne D’Hotelle!

U.S. District Court Flatly Denies Claims of Injury under FATCA and Title 31-FBAR Reporting Requirements: Upholds FATCA, IGAs and the FBAR Requirements to Encourage Tax Compliance and “Combat Tax Evasion”

There has been a case floating around since a complaint was filed this summer by Senator Rand Paul (current Presidential candidate) and various other current and former U.S. citizens including a Mr. Kisch who is resident in Toronto, Canada and a Mr. Crawford who lives in Albania; along with other individuals.  Crawford v. United States Dep’t of the Treasury, 2015 U.S. Dist.  The complaint asked for declaratory and injunctive relief.Passport Inside Back Page - USC Taxation Reference

The District Court granted neither and dismissed the case in favor of the government in a bold fashion upholding FATCA and FBAR/Title 31 reporting and information requirements.   Importantly, the Court concluded by saying ” . . . The FATCA statute, the IGAs, and the FBAR requirements encourage compliance with tax laws, combat tax evasion, and deter the use of foreign accounts to engage in criminal activity. A preliminary injunction would harm these efforts and intrude upon the province of Congress and the President to determine how best to achieve these policy goals.”

See a prior post regarding how FATCA affects United States citizens (USCs) and lawful permanent residents (LPRs) residing outside the U.S.; as was the case of many of the complainants in the case, Part 1- Unintended Consequences of FATCA – for USCs and LPRs Living Outside the U.S., posted August 13, 2014.

Also, the tax publication/resource, Tax Analysts summarized the original complaint (which can be read in its entirety here) as follows:

           The FATCA suit makes the following claims:

  • the IGAs are unconstitutional sole executive agreements because they exceed the scope of the president’s independent constitutional powers, and because they override FATCA;
  • the heightened reporting requirements for foreign financial accounts deny U.S. citizens living abroad the equal protection of the laws;
  • the FATCA FFI penalty, passthrough penalty, and willfulness penalty are all unconstitutional under the excessive fines clause;
  • FATCA’s information reporting requirements are unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment; and
  • the IGAs’ information reporting requirements are also unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.

See, complete Tax Note’s article of July 15, 2015:  Sen. Paul Files Lawsuit Challenging FATCA, by William R. Davis and Andrew Velarde.Chart - USCs Who Renounce Compared to LPRs who Abandon

Not unsurprisingly, the District Court ruled in favor of the government and dismissed the majority of the claims by a finding that the parties lacked standing to bring the suit and that ” . . . The FATCA statute, the IGAs, and the FBAR requirements encourage compliance with tax laws . . .”

Some highlights of the Court’s opinion [with my emphasis added] are set out below:

* * *

  1. Background

A. FATCA Statute and Regulations

Congress passed the Foreign Accounts Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) in 2010 to improve compliance with tax laws by U.S. taxpayers holding foreign accounts. FATCA accomplishes this through two forms of reporting: (1) by foreign financial institutions (FFIs) about financial accounts held by U.S. taxpayers or foreign entities in which U.S. taxpayers hold a substantial ownership interest, 26 U.S.C. § 1471; and, (2) by U.S. taxpayers about their interests in certain foreign financial accounts and offshore assets. 26 U.S.C. § 6038D.

  1. FATCA

President Obama signed FATCA into law on March 18, 2010. Senator Carl Levin, a co-sponsor of the FATCA legislation, declared that “offshore tax abuses [targeted by FATCA] cost the federal treasury an estimated $100 billion in lost tax revenues annually” 156 Cong. Rec. 5 S1745-01 (2010). FATCA became law as the IRS began its Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program (OVDP), which since 2009 has allowed U.S. taxpayers with undisclosed overseas assets to disclose them and pay reduced penalties. By 2014, the OVDP collected $6.5 billion through voluntary disclosures from 45,000 participants. “IRS Makes Changes to Offshore Programs; Revisions Ease Burden and Help More Taxpayers Come into Compliance,” http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/IRS-Makes-Changes-to-Offshore-Programs;-Revisions-Ease-Burden-and-Help-More-Taxpayers-Come-into-Compliance (last visited Sept. 15, 2015). The success of the voluntary program has likely been enhanced by the existence of FATCA.

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C. Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Account

The third body of law at issue in this case pertains to the Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Account (FBAR) requirements.  U.S. persons who hold a financial account in a foreign country that exceeds $10,000 in aggregate value must file an FBAR with the Treasury Department reporting the account. See 31 U.S.C. § 5314; 31 C.F.R. § 1010.350; 31 C.F.R. § 1010.306(c). The current FBAR form is FinCEN Form 114. The form has been due by June 30 of each year regarding accounts held during the previous calendar year. § 1010.306(c). Beginning with the 2016 tax year, the due date of the form will be April 15. Pub. L. No. 114-41, § 2006(b)(11). A person who fails to file a required FBAR may be assessed a civil monetary penalty. 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)(A). The amount of the penalty is capped at $10,000 unless the failure was willful. See 5321(a)(5)(B)(i), (C). A willful failure to file increases the maximum penalty to $100,000 or half the value in the account at the time of the violation, whichever is greater. § 5321(a)(5)(C). In either case, whether to impose the penalty and the amount of the penalty are committed to the Secretary’s discretion. See § 5321(a)(5)(A) (“The Secretary of the Treasury may impose a civil money penalty[.]”) & § 5321(a)(5)(B) (“[T]he amount of any civil penalty . . . shall not exceed” the statutory ceiling). Plaintiffs seek to enjoin enforcement of the willful FBAR penalty under § 5321(a)(5). Prayer for Relief, part Q. They also ask for an injunction against “the FBAR account-balance reporting requirement” of FinCen Form 114. Prayer for Relief, part W.

      The Government asserts that the information in the FBAR assists law enforcement and the IRS in identifying unreported taxable income of U.S. taxpayers that is held in foreign accounts as  well as investigating money laundering and terrorism.

* * *

     Mark Crawford decries his bank’s policy against taking U.S. citizens as clients and claims the denial of his application for a brokerage account may have “impacted Mark financially,” ¶ 21, any such harm is not fairly traceable to an action by Defendants, which are not responsible for decisions that foreign banks make about whom to accept as clients. Crawford cannot establish standing indirectly when third parties are the causes of his alleged injuries. See Shearson, 725 F.3d at 592. Moreover, his discomfort with complying with the disclosures required by FATCA, see ¶23, does not establish the concrete, particularized harm that confers standing to sue. See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (requiring “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent” injury). Even if Crawford fears “unconstitutionally excessive fines imposed by 31 U.S.C. § 5321 if he willfully fails to file an FBAR,” ¶ 24, there is no allegation that he failed to file any FBAR that may have been required, much less that the Government has assessed an “excessive” FBAR penalty against him. Any harm that may come his way from imagined future events is speculative and cannot form the foundation for his lawsuit.

* * *

    None of the allegations states that Kuettel is presently being harmed by FATCA or the Swiss IGA, and neither FATCA nor the IGA apply to him as a non-U.S. citizen. See ¶¶ 51-58.  His assertion of past harm because he was “mostly unsuccessful” in refinancing his mortgage due to FATCA does not convey standing. If that was a harm, it was due to actions of third-party foreign banks not those of Defendants. Regardless, having now renounced his American citizenship and obtained refinancing on terms he found acceptable, any past harm is not redressable here. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 210-11 (1995) (“[T]he fact of past injury . . . does nothing to establish a real and immediate threat that he would again suffer similar injury in the future.” (quotation omitted)). This leaves Kuettel’s claims concerning the FBAR requirement, in Counts 3 and 6, for which the Government concedes Kuettel has standing. Response, ECF 16, at 15, PAGEID 216.

* * *

    Donna-Lane Nelson is a citizen of Switzerland who has also renounced her U.S. citizenship. ¶ 59. She alleges that her Swiss bank “notified her that she would not be able to open a new account if she ever closed her existing one because she was an American. Fearing that she would eventually not be able to bank in the country where she lived, she decided to relinquish her U.S. citizenship.” ¶ 65. After she renounced, a Swiss bank “offered investment opportunities that were not available to her as an American.” Id. She “resents having to provide” “explanations” to Swiss banks that have requested information on her past U.S. citizenship and payments to her daughter, who lives in the United States, and she sees “threats implied by these requests which appear to be prompted by FATCA.” ¶ 68. Like other Plaintiffs, Nelson does not want to disclose financial information to the Government, and she fears willful FBAR penalties, even though no such penalty has been imposed or threatened against her. ¶¶ 69, 70. Unlike the preceding Plaintiffs, however, she adds that she fears the 30% withholding tax may be imposed against her “if her business partner,” who is now her husband, and with whom she has joint accounts, “opts to become a recalcitrant account holder.” ¶

* * *

L. Marc Zell states that he is a practicing attorney and a citizen of both the United States and Israel who lives in Israel. He alleges that: (1) he and his firm have been required by Israeli banking institutions to complete IRS withholding forms for individuals whose funds his firm holds in trust, regardless of whether the forms are legally required, causing certain clients to leave his firm, ¶¶ 79 & 81; (2) Israeli banks have required his firm to close accounts, refused to open others, and requested conduct contrary to banking regulations, ¶¶ 79-80; and, (3) the compelled disclosure of his fiduciary relationship with clients impinges on the attorney-client relationship, ¶ 82. On request of clients, who claim their rights are violated by FATCA, Zell “has decided not to comply with the FATCA disclosure requirements whenever that alternative exists.” ¶ 83. He fears that the FATCA 30% withholding tax on pass-through payments to recalcitrant account holders could be imposed due to his refusal to provide identifying information about a client to an Israeli bank. ¶ He also has refused to provide information to his own bank and “fears that he will be classified as a recalcitrant account holder,” ¶ 85. Like the other Plaintiffs, he does not want his financial information disclosed, ¶ 86, and fears an FBAR penalty if the IRS determines that he willfully failed to file an FBAR, ¶ 87.

     The majority of Zell’s allegations concern conduct of Israeli banks and his belief that the actions have been unfair to him or his clients. But conduct of third parties (even if related to the banks’ compliance with FATCA) does not confer standing to bring suit against Defendants. See, e.g., Ammex Inc. v. United States, 367 F.3d 530, 533 (6th Cir. 2004). Nor may Zell seek redress on behalf of third parties who have allegedly suffered harm, including unidentified clients. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). The third parties who have allegedly suffered harm are not plaintiffs, thus, alleged harm to them does not provide a basis for Zell to maintain this suit. The contention that disclosure of the identity of clients for whom Zell holds funds in trust violates the attorney-client privilege is also without merit. He gives no example of harm that has occurred or how he was harmed by disclosure of clients’ identities. He cannot raise the attorney-client privilege on his clients’ behalf, nor is the fact of representation privileged. See In re Special Sept. 1978 Grand Jury (II), 640 F.2d 49, 62 (7th Cir. 1980) (“[A]ttorney-client privilege belongs to the client alone[.]”); United States v. Robinson, 121 F.3d 971, 976 (5th Cir. 1997) (“The fact of representation . . . is generally not within the privilege.”). It is the fiduciary relationship, not the attorney-client relationship, that is the basis for the reporting requirement.

* * *

   “We begin, of course, with the presumption that the challenged statute”—FATCA—“is  valid. Its wisdom is not the concern of the courts; if a challenged action does not violate the Constitution, it must be sustained[.]” INS v. Chadha, 426 U.S. 919, 944 (1983); see also National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2594 (2012) (“‘[E]very reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.’” (quoting Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895))).

* * *

Plaintiffs decry that U.S. citizens living in foreign countries are in this manner treated differently than U.S. citizens living in the United States. According to Plaintiffs, the federal government has no legitimate interest in knowing the amount of any income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit recognized on a foreign account, whether a foreign account was opened or closed during the year, or the balance of a foreign account.

       Plaintiffs contend that the “heightened reporting requirements” imposed by FATCA, the FBAR information-reporting requirements, and the Canadian, Swiss, Czech, and Israeli IGAs, violate the Fifth Amendment rights of “U.S. citizens living in a foreign country” and should be enjoined. See Complaint ¶¶ 124-130

* * *

Plaintiffs’ equal protection claims fail because the statutes, regulations, and executive agreements that they challenge simply do not make the classification they assert. None of the challenged provisions single out U.S. citizens living abroad. Instead, all Americans with specified foreign bank accounts or assets are subject to reporting requirements, no matter where they happen to live. The provisions Plaintiffs contend discriminate against “U.S. citizens living abroad” actually apply to all U.S. taxpayers, no matter their residence.

* * *

The distinction that the regulations do make is rationally related to a legitimate government interest. The U.S. tax system is based in large part on voluntary compliance: taxpayers are expected to disclose their sources of income annually on their federal tax returns. The information reporting required by FATCA is intended to address the use of offshore accounts to facilitate tax evasion, and to strengthen the integrity of the voluntary compliance system by placing U.S. taxpayers that have access to offshore investment opportunities in an equal position with U.S. taxpayers that invest within the United States. Third party information reporting is an important tool used by the IRS to close the tax gap between taxes due and taxes paid. The knowledge that financial institutions will also be disclosing information about an account encourages individuals to properly disclose their income on their tax returns. See Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in Tax Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695, 711 (2007).

       Unlike most countries, U.S. taxpayers are subject to tax on their worldwide income, and their  investments have become increasingly global in scope. Absent the FATCA reporting by FFIs, some U.S. taxpayers may attempt to evade U.S. tax by hiding money in offshore accounts where, prior to FATCA, they were not subject to automatic reporting to the IRS by FFIs. The information required to be reported, including payments made or credited to the account and the balance or value of the account is to assist the IRS in determining previously unreported income and the value of such information is based on experience from the DOJ prosecution of offshore tax evasion. See Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations bipartisan report on “Offshore Tax Evasion: The Effort to Collect Unpaid Taxes on Billions in Hidden Offshore Accounts,” February 26, 2014; see also Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 29 (1974) (“when law enforcement personnel are confronted with the secret foreign bank account or the secret foreign financial institution they are placed in an impossible situation…they must subject themselves to time consuming and often times fruitless foreign legal process.”).

The FBAR reporting requirements, likewise, have a rational basis. As the Supreme Court noted in California Bankers, when Congress enacted the Bank Secrecy Act (which provides the statutory basis for the FBAR), it “recognized that the use of financial institutions, both domestic and foreign, in furtherance of activities designed to evade the regulatory mechanism of the United States, had markedly increased.” Id. at 38. The Government has a legitimate interest in collecting information about foreign accounts, including account balances held by U.S. citizens, for the same reason that it requires reporting of information on U.S.-based accounts. The information assists law enforcement and the IRS, among other things, in identifying unreported taxable income of U.S. taxpayers that is held in foreign accounts. Without FBAR reporting, the Government’s efforts to track financial crime and tax evasion would be hampered.

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In Count Six, Plaintiffs contend that the FBAR “Willfullness Penalty” is unconstitutional under the Excessive Fines Clause. Plaintiffs decry that 26 U.S.C. § 5321 imposes a penalty of up to $100,000 or 50% of the balance of the account at the time of the violation, whichever is greater, for failures to file an FBAR as required by 26 U.S.C. § 5314 (the FBAR “Willfulness Penalty”). 31 U.S.C. § 5321(b)(5)(C)(i). 31

Plaintiffs allege the Willfulness Penalty is designed to punish and is therefore subject to the Excessive Fines Clause. Plaintiffs further allege the Willfulness Penalty is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offense.

Plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claims, however, are not ripe for adjudication because no withholding or FBAR penalty has been imposed against any Plaintiff . . .

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IV. Conclusion

Plaintiffs have failed to establish that they are entitled to a preliminary injunction . . .  The FATCA statute, the IGAs, and the FBAR requirements encourage compliance with tax laws, combat tax evasion,37 and deter the use of foreign accounts to engage in criminal activity. A preliminary injunction would harm these efforts and intrude upon the province of Congress and the President to determine how best to achieve these policy goals. Thus, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, ECF 8, is DENIED.

DONE and ORDERED in Dayton, Ohio, this Tuesday, September 29, 2015.

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Crawford v. U.S. Department of Treasury, 15-cv-00250, U.S. District Court, Southern District of Ohio (Dayton).

For those U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents residing outside the U.S. who expected the Courts to be sympathetic to their legal arguments somehow invalidating  Chapter 4/FATCA and the FBAR filing requirements under Title 31, they will surely be disappointed by the result.

IRS Announcement this Month (April 2015): IRS Reminds Those with Foreign Assets of U.S. Tax Obligations

The IRS again this year reminded U.S. citizens residing overseas of their tax return filing obligations.  IRS Form 1040 p1

In the IRS announcement, IR-2015-70, April 10, 2015, titled IRS Reminds Those with Foreign Assets of U.S. Tax Obligations, the federal agency charged with enforcement of U.S. federal tax and financial account reporting laws, provides in part as follows:

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Most People Abroad Need to File

A filing requirement generally applies even if a taxpayer qualifies for tax benefits, such as the foreign earned income exclusion or the foreign tax credit , that substantially reduce or eliminate their U.S. tax liability. These tax benefits are not automatic and are only available if an eligible taxpayer files a U.S. income tax return.

The filing deadline is Monday, June 15, 2015, for U.S. citizens and resident aliens whose tax home and abode are outside the United States and Puerto Rico, and for those serving in the military outside the U.S. and Puerto Rico, on the regular due date of their tax return. To use this automatic two-month extension, taxpayers must attach a statement to their return explaining which of these two situations applies. See U.S. Citizens and Resident Aliens Abroad for details.

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Prior posts have discussed related filing issues, including the following: